Maybe common disk encryption is so compromised, there's no point to implementing?

Tracy Reed treed at
Sat May 3 22:48:32 PDT 2014

On Sat, May 03, 2014 at 09:39:02AM PDT, Tony Su spake thusly:
> It seems to me if true that this is exactly the type of compromise that
> hits at the purpose of full disk encryption, the protection of "data at
> rest" -- You don't want someone to be able to enable "data at rest" to be
> "not at rest."

This is NOT the purpose of full disk encryption. See my reply to Stewart.

Tracy Reed
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