[Kooler] Clueless Movie reviews

[John Oliver]

Chris Horner wrote:

> It's only barely conceivable that the US public would have sucked it up,
> although there is precedent:  Sinking of the USS Panay by Japanese
> aircraft (Dec, 1937) and intermittent killings of US
> Marines/Soldiers/missionaries during the late '30s were basically swept
> under the rug by politicans and media.

My point exactly.  American pride could never accept a major strike like
that.  So, we go to Tracy's other possible sceario, that of the Japanese
not attacking Pearl Harbor at all.  That would be a gamble for them...
how much were they willing to bet that we'd keep quietly hunkered down
while our allies screamed for help on the one hand, and we saw the
Rising Sun coming closer and closer all the time on the other?  History
says they weren't willing to make that bet and preferred to try to make
us fold our hand.  God, if our aircraft carriers had been in port that
day, the war in the Pacific would've lasted quite a bit longer.  It was
the carrier-borne air wings from the Wasp, Hornet, and Enterprise that
stemmed the tide and then turned the Japanese back at Midway.  It
would've taken us longer than that to build a new fleet, and the
old-time admirals would've insisted on building battleships first.

> Perhaps.  By 1941, Japan had very little in the way of amphibious
> forces, making a long range coastal assault very difficult.  Hell, they
> could barely manage mostly unopposed landings in the Philipines and
> Malaysia.  However, amphibious assault of the US was in the Japanese
> warplans as well as considered in our Rainbow plans as early as 1921.
> Morison's "History of United States Navy Operations in WWII" Bk. III,
> states that the assumption by military planners in 1941  was that ann
> amphibious invasion of the west coast would not be halted until the
> invader reached Chicago, so it was at least somewhat of a threat.

It was a possibility that had to be considered (the West Coast did have
blackouts at night, etc.)  But, like you said, their amphibious
capability was limited.  especially after Pearl Harbor, the torrent of
new enlistees into the armed services would've quickly made a landing by
the Japanese, thousands of miles away from their base of operations with
a tenuous supply line, a losing bet.

> BANG! Right on the head. There was no reason whatsoever to attack our
> fleet at PH, because the US had no intention of protecting anything
> other than it's own posessions in the Pacific theater ( Allied ABC-1
> Staff Agreement March1 1941).  Part of Roosevelt's "help beat hitler
> first" strategy.  All the attack of PH did was ensure that we were drawn
> into a contest of industry that the Japanese were not capable of winning.

If they hadn't have struck first, they would've had to deal with the US
making progressively louder sounds, all while building up our forces. 
Our military industrial capacity was already turning up because of the
fighting in Europe and needing to send supplies to the Allies.  As that
engine gained life and speed, there would have been more and more
capacity to send West to face the growing incursion of the Japanese into
waters closer and closer to us.  Eventually, we would have had a Navy
too large to face under any circumstances.  So, they were better off
striking quickly and hoping that we would be so debilitated that by the
time we got to our feet again, they would have consolidated their gains,
and could then negotiate from a position of strength.

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